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# Jury Deliberates Charges In Kampiles Spy Trial

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

HAMMOND, Ind.—A somber-faced federal court jury began deliberating the espionage charges against former Central Intelligence Agency officer William Kampiles last night after he glumly acknowledged on the witness stand that he had confessed to the FBI.

The jurors recessed at 2 a.m. Eastern time and will convene again later this morning.

Kampiles, 23, insisted that his statements then were "false" and said he had tried to recant the very next day, but his lawyers found themselves boxed in when they tried to show why.

Continuing the extraordinary secrecy that attended the two-week trial, U.S. District Court Judge Phil M. McNaghy Jr. issued a sealed ruling yesterday morning that inhibited Kampiles' lawyers from asking the young defendant whether he had been intimidated.

The judge, it was understood, held that this line of questioning would open the door to an even more damaging counterattack by government prosecutors. Kampiles had been given a polygraph test two times before he made his confession last August and, according to reliable sources, he failed both times.

As a result, Kampiles, who had taken the witness stand in his own defense, was forced to admit, again and again, to telling FBI agents last Aug. 15 that he had indeed stolen a top-secret manual on the KH11 spy satellite from the CIA Operations Center last year and later sold it to the Russians for \$3,000 on a trip to Athens last February.

"That's what I said, yes," Kampiles testified repeatedly in the face of a relentless, point-by-point recitation by government prosecutor James Richmond.

Chief defense counsel Michael D. Monico, his voice choking with emotion, tried to repair the damage with an impassioned final argument, in which he urged the jurors to disregard the confession as "untrue, unreliable and incredible."

He protested that the government was in such "a rush to prosecute this case" that no effort was made to find out whether anyone at the CIA Operations Center had seen the manual after Kampiles quit the agency in November 1977.

"Just because you get a kid to admitting to something he didn't do, that doesn't make a case," Monico protested. Nodding at Kampiles, the lawyer added, almost shouting:

"He wants to scream out his innocence. Don't convict him on statements that came out of his own mouth that day [Aug. 15]. He told them it wasn't true on the 16th. They paid no attention. He told them it wasn't true on the 17th. They paid no attention!

"Please," Monico urged the jurors, "pay attention! End the nightmare."

U.S. attorney David T. Ready reminded the courtroom, however, that Kampiles had actually told "three stories about what went on in Greece" last winter.

The son of Greek immigrants, Kampiles tried the first version on a Washington friend of his, Anastasia Thamagos, on his return from the trip last March. Kampiles told her that he had met a foreigner on the flight to Athens in February and that he told the man he was looking for a job. According to this version, the foreigner suggested he go to the Russian embassy, which he did, meeting a Russian agent named "Michael" who paid him \$3,000 for promising to serve as a spy.

Thamagos said she didn't believe the story, but, at Kampiles' request, she passed it on to a mutual friend at the CIA, George Joannides, who didn't believe it either.

"He could have called George himself," Ready pointed out. "Why didn't he? Because he wanted to know whether that story would work and he found out. George didn't buy that story. He thought it was a fantasy. So when he met George in April, he had a new story."

According to this version, Ready reminded the jurors in sarcastic tones, Kampiles happened to be wandering past the Soviet embassy in Athens, around midnight in the middle of February, when he noticed an outdoor garden party in progress there.

By this account, Kampiles wandered in, met "Michael" and "conned" the Russian intelligence officer out of \$3,000 over a series of meetings by convincing "Michael" that he worked for the CIA and promising to come back with important information on a future trip to Greece.

Ready scoffed at the story. The Russians, he declared, "don't pay for a pig on the poke." FBI agents didn't believe Kampiles when he repeated the account to them on Aug. 14, Ready said, and they arranged another interrogation the next day with FBI agent James K. Murphy who confronted him with "inconsistencies" in the account.

It was then and only then, the prosecutor submitted, that Kampiles "told the truth."

FBI witnesses at the trial testified repeatedly that the Russians "never" pay hard cash simply on promises, but Monico contended otherwise. He introduced into the record a CIA study of Soviet operational techniques and gambits which indicated that the Russians will pay money simply to recruit someone.

"Soviet intelligence believes that Americans will do almost anything for money, and the factor of material incentive is somewhere present in every type of recruitment operation," the CIA study said. Quoting from a Soviet intelligence document, the study continued that the Russians advise their officers that "the successful use of financial motivation in recruitment requires an understanding of the psychological makeup of the average American. He seriously thinks of money as the only thing which can ensure his personal freedom and independence."

The defense, however, suffered another setback when it called a last-minute witness, another young CIA officer named Jacqueline Cooper, who also worked in the Operations Center when Kampiles did and for some months after he left. Interviewed by defense representatives over the telephone earlier this week, she had apparently given them the impression that she had seen the missing KH11 manual, the one Kampiles was accused of stealing, in December 1977 after he had left.

On the witness stand, however, she said she thought she might have actually seen a KH 11 "Handbook," a popularized version of the "Manual," which the Operations Center still had on hand.

While Monico sat back in frustration, government prosecutors used Cooper's unexpected appearance to ask her what her reputation Kampiles had for "truth and veracity" among his CIA co-workers.

"It's not very good," she testified.

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Estimates by outsiders - Moos

Strategic estimate

Sov viewpoint

Are they up w/us



strategic team

Euphoria for China

Assume US mil burden

Assume Anti-Sov burden

Wouk - Historical complaints lack US resolve

NFAC \$ - scholarships -

indentured servitude

List of areas of concern

What do diff for long term

forecasting due Iran?

Press issues:

1) Impact perceptions mil strength

Strategic - COS's

Conv - NIE 11-10

Press quasi-dynamic comparisons